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both the determinants and consequences of monetary policy transparency in an integrated econometric
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of transparency.  Using these political determinants as instruments for transparency, we show that
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Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates
1 





  Commenting on British monetary policy in 1929, Otto Niemeyer, director of 
financial inquiries at H.M. Treasury, observed that ￿In prewar days a change in bank rate 
was no more regarded as the business of the Treasury than the colour which the Bank 
painted its front door.￿
2  In 1987 William Greider entitled his expose of the Federal 
Reserve Secrets of the Temple.
3  Since then the world of monetary policy has changed.  
Transparency now is a byword.  Central banks are supposed to be open about their 
objectives, outlooks, policy strategies, and even their mistakes.  The days when monetary 
policy deliberations were regarded as no more the business of outsiders than the color 
than the central bank chose to paint its door are now firmly in the past. 
  Or so it might seem.  Assessing whether this move in the direction of policy 
transparency is permanent ￿ and if so how far it might go ￿ or whether it might be 
reversed requires understanding what lies behind the trend in the first place.  One view is 
that transparency enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy.  Transparency about 
monetary policy objectives, outlooks and strategies is necessary for effective 
communication with the markets, and effective communication is necessary for monetary 
                                                 
1 State Planning Organization, Ankara, and University of California, Berkeley, respectively.  An earlier 
version of this paper was presented to the conference on Money Matters: The Law, Politics and Economics 
of Currency, held at Tel Aviv University on 7-9 January 2009.  We are grateful to Tal Sadeh and other 
conference participants for helpful comments. 
2 Cited in Eichengreen, Watson and Grossman (1985). 
3 See Greider (1987).   2
policy to have stabilizing effects.  Policy transparency makes it easier for observers to 
anticipate central bank actions and minimizes disruptions when policies change.  It 
enhances the ability of policy makers to manage expectations, which is a key channel 
through which monetary policy affects outcomes.  Transparency about not just current 
but also expected future policy gives the central bank leverage over long-term interest 
rates (which depend on expectations) and thus provides an important mechanism for 
influencing consumption and investment. 
The seminal research on this subject built on the Barro-Gordon (1983) model in 
which wages are set now on the basis of expected future monetary policy.
4  Imagine, for 
example, that inflationary pressures are building and unions contemplate raising their 
wage demands.  If the central bank is transparent about the priority it attaches to price 
stability, the risk it perceives that inflation will exceed its target, and the likelihood of 
having to respond by raising interest rates, then wage setters will have reason to 
anticipate that inflationary pressures will subside.  They will be less likely to demand 
higher wages now that would, require costly and difficult wage reductions in the future.  
The disruptions to the economy from policies to contain inflation would be less.  And 
monetary policy makers are less likely to fall prey to an expectations trap in which 
expectations drift off in ways that force them into unpalatable policy choices.
5 
Transparency thus allows the central bank to more effectively communicate with 
the markets.  It helps it to credibly commit.  It is a way for monetary policy makers to 
communicate the importance they attach to price stability.
6  This in turn enables them to 
                                                 
4 See for example Geraats (2002a,b). 
5 See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Christiano and Gust (2000). 
6 Faust and Svensson (2001) consider a model in which the public attempts to infer whether or not the 
central bank is serious about limiting inflation from information on policy outcomes.  Its inferences are   3
respond flexibly to disturbances without undermining confidence in their commitment to 
their long-term target.   
  A second view is that transparency is a mechanism for democratic accountability 
in a world of policy discretion and central bank independence.  Once upon a time central 
bank policy was constrained by rules like those of the gold standard, if not absolutely 
then at least more tightly than today.  Central banks may have had statutory independence 
￿ many of them were in fact still private banks ￿ but they did not have policy 
independence.
7  The demise of the gold standard was associated with the spread of 
modern central banking but also with increasing central bank dependence on the 
government (as alluded to in Niemeyer￿s quote above).  At this stage there was no 
question about the political accountability of the central bank.  More recently has there 
been recognition of the efficiency advantages of delegating the conduct of monetary 
policy to an independent entity.  Moreover, with the move away from pegged exchange 
rates, central banks have acquired greater discretion over the stance of policy.  But with 
the growth of independent powers comes a need for democratic accountability, for 
assurance that the independent technocrats now with discretion over monetary policy 
                                                                                                                                                 
imperfect because of unanticipated policy-implementation errors that the public is incompletely able to 
observe.  Greater transparency about economic conditions thus enables agents to infer the central bank￿s 
preferences more accurately.  In turn this gives the monetary authority an incentive to build a reputation for 
valuing price stability.  The private sector becomes more sensitive to unanticipated policy responses and 
actions, attenuating the incentive for the central bank to engage in them.  The result is thus greater 
sensitivity of inflation expectations to policy actions, the less benefit to the central bank of inflating, and 
less inflationary bias.  In this way increased transparency about control errors improves social welfare.  
Greater transparency about the central bank￿s objectives may be more of a mixed blessing in this 
framework.  Transparency about objectives, in addition to reducing uncertainty about future inflation and 
output, which will be welfare improving other things equal, removes the central bank￿s incentive to curtail 
inflation in order to signal its type, which can be welfare reducing. 
7 Moreover, the influence of monetary policy over economic and financial conditions, while never 
something about which observers were exactly ignorant, was less fully appreciated than today, when 
traders hold their breath on the days when the central bank announces its interest-rate decision.   And where 
the extent of the franchise and of political contestability were limited, there was no more need for the 
central bank to be democratically accountable than any other branch of government.   4
decisions take those decisions in a manner consistent with the public interest and will be 
taken to task for failing to do so. This mechanism for democratic accountability will be 
effective only if the central bank is transparent about its decisions ￿ only if those deciding 
monetary policy cannot claim that their policy decisions are, in fact, in the public interest 
for reasons that only they understand.  In the absence of adequate transparency, suspicion 
about central bank motives may develop, and pressures to curb the institution￿s 
independence may be irresistible.       
Both rationales have been questioned.  If asymmetric information is a distortion, 
then the theory of the second best suggests that removing one distortion in the presence 
of another may not be welfare improving.  It is not hard to construct scenarios in which 
additional transparency destabilizes expectations and accentuates financial market 
volatility.
8  Similarly, there are critics of the view that transparency can substitute 
adequately for direct political sanctions as a mechanism for holding monetary policy 
makers accountable.
9 
  In addition, even those who embrace these efficiency- and accountability-based 
arguments wonder whether central bank transparency can go too far.  The European 
Central Bank has justified its refusal to publish the minutes and voting records of its 
board on the grounds that individual members would then be subject to pressure from 
                                                 
8 Morris and Shin (2002, 2005) illustrate the point in a model in which individual welfare depends not just 
on the state of the world but on the actions of other individuals (there exists a coordination externality).  
Starting from a position where both private and public information are imperfect, they show that greater 
precision of public information can lead individuals to attach inadequate weight to private information.  In 
the absence of coordination motives, the precision attached to the public and private signals will be 
commensurate with their relative precision.  When coordination motives are present, however, agents 
attach greater weight to the public signal, since they know this to be common information.  But since the 
public signal is noisy, this weight on the public signal may be suboptimal from a social-welfare point of 
view; agents may be led to coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium.  This adverse outcome is more likely 
the more precise is private information. 
9 Thus, some critics of the European Central Bank, whose transnational status, embedded in an 
international treaty, makes it difficult for national politicians to sanction those responsible for its policy, 
question whether policy transparency provides adequate political accountability.   5
special interests (national interests, in its context) that compromised their independence 
and led to inefficient policy decisions.
10  Clare and Courtenay (2001) argue that minutes 
describing contentious discussion among central bank board members can heighten asset-
price volatility, suggesting that copious information only confuses investors.  More 
generally, van der Cruijsen, Eijffinger and Hoogduin (2008) suggest that agents may be 
confused by the large and increasing amount of information with which they are 
bombarded in a highly transparent regime.  They suggest that excessive transparency may 
cause agents to realize how uncertain the central bank is about economic conditions and 
the efficacy of policy, in turn heightening volatility. Others ask whether requiring the 
central bank to provide detailed information about its intermediate targets, only to miss 
them, might similarly confuse and raise questions about the competence of policy 
makers.  Thus Goodhart (2001) questions the efficacy of requiring the central bank to 
provide information on not just, inter alia, inflation forecasts but also its forecasts for the 
future path of the monetary policy instrument, on the grounds that this would so 
complicate decision making (board members would have to agree on an entire trajectory 
for their policy instrument at each decision point) as to potentially undermine effective 
decision making.
11  Mishkin (2004) warns that a high degree of transparency might 
disrupt communication with the public, which would not easily understand that forecasts 
for the policy instrument are conditional on the future state of the economy, and which 
might misinterpret changes in the forecast (or deviations between forecast and realized 
rates) as the central bank reneging on its commitments.   
                                                 
10 See Hamalainen (2001) for an early statement to this effect. 
11 Some central banks go part way toward indicating the prospective future path of interest rates; the 
Federal Reserve, for example, regularly signals its ￿bias￿ toward future interest-rate increases or reductions 
by issuing a ￿balance of risks￿ statement.   6
We cannot resolve these debates here, but the evidence we present speaks to 
them. Specifically, in this paper, which is the latest in a series we have writing on the 
subject of central bank transparency, we undertake three tasks.
12  First, we document 
changes in the prevalence of central bank transparency, updating our measures through 
2006.  Second, we analyze the determinants of the degree of transparency, focusing here 
on the role of political variables.  Third, we examine the consequences for monetary-
policy outcomes such as inflation variability and inflation persistence.  Here we probe for 
nonlinear effects of transparency on policy outcomes as a way of providing a provisional 
answer to Mishkin￿s (2004) question of whether ￿transparency can go too far.￿ A 
methodologically significant aspect of our work is that we consider the determinants of 
transparency and the effects using a unified analytical framework.  This means that we 
can use our analysis of the determinants to identify instrumental variables that address the 
concern that an observed correlation between outcomes and transparency reflects the 
impact of the former on the latter, rather than the other way around. 
 
2.  Data 
  Our indices of central bank transparency follow the work of Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2006).  In contrast to earlier studies, most of which focused on particular aspects 
of transparency (for example, whether the central bank announced an explicit target for 
inflation), Eijffinger and Geraats acknowledged that transparency has multiple 
dimensions.  The result is 15 subindices (detailed in the appendix) designed to capture the 
political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of monetary policy 
                                                 
12 See also Dincer and Eichengreen (2007).   7
transparency.
13  Political transparency denotes openness about policy objectives; 
economic transparency openness about data, models and forecasts; procedural 
transparency openness about the way decisions are taken; policy transparency openness 
about the policy implications; and operational transparency openness about the 
implementation of those decisions. 
We draw our data from information on central banks￿ websites and in their 
statutes, annual reports, and other published documents. We gather this information for as 
large a number of central banks as possible (where Eijiffinger and Geraats looked at just 
nine central banks).
14  In addition, we gather the same information for every year from 
1998 through 2006. Where there was a change in some aspect of transparency over the 
course of a calendar year, we take the value that prevailed for the largest portion of the 
year.
15   
We were able to assemble this information for 100 central banks.
16  Most of the 
omissions are central banks of micro-states: our sample includes the central banks of all 
large, systemically significant countries.
17     
                                                 
13 The overall index thus runs from 0 to 15.  Adopting the same criteria used by these previous investigators 
has the advantage of facilitating comparisons across studies and frees us of suspicions that we have 
constructed our measures so as to maximize or minimize the impact of transparency. 
14 An earlier study by Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001) also considered 15 aspects of central bank 
transparency, although they considered only four central banks.  De Haan, Amtembrink and Waller (2004) 
developed a similar index for six countries, while De Haan and Amtembrink (2003) apply a similar 
approach to 15 countries.  Siklos (2002) expands coverage to 20 central banks, all from advanced industrial 
countries.  The most comprehensive previous study in terms of country coverage is Fry et al. (2000), 
although they construct indices only for 1998. 
15 Adding this time dimension was particularly challenging, since many central bank websites describe 
current practice but not that of prior years.  For this we had to rely mainly on published documents.  We 
were able to access a relatively complete run of these on the basis of holdings in the University of 
California and Joint IMF-World Bank libraries. We are grateful to the staff of the Joint Bank-Fund library 
for granting us access to their collection. 
16 This is the vast majority of central banks in the world (recall that there are more countries than there are 
central banks, given the existence of monetary unions, countries that have unilaterally adopted the 
currencies of other countries, etc.).  A subsequent study by Crowe and Meade (2008) constructs measures 
of transparency very similar to our own but only since 2000 and for a much smaller (37 country) sample 
(their purpose being to compare measure of central bank transparency and independence).   8
Table 1 shows the results by country and region.  The most transparent central 
banks in 2006, according to our coding, were the Swedish Riksbank, the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, the Czech National Bank, the 
ECB, and the Central Bank of Hungary.  We see here a number of countries that received 
high marks for transparency in previous studies (Sweden, New Zealand, the UK, Canada) 
but also others (the Czech Republic, Hungary), which is a reminder of the advantages of 
broad country coverage and of the fact that a number of countries with relatively opaque 
central banking practices have been moving in the direction of greater transparency.  The 
six least transparent central banks were those of Aruba, Bermuda, Ethiopia, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen.  Table 2 shows our coding of the 15 individual components for these 
13 countries as of 2006. 
More generally, we can compare different dimensions of central bank 
transparency.  In 2006, 65 central banks received scores of 2 or more for political 
transparency (inter alia, providing a quantitative definition of their objectives to the 
public).
18  Economic transparency (disclosing data, the policy model and forecasts) is 
less; only 5 central banks receive the highest possible rating. The picture is similar for 
procedural transparency (the release of minutes and votes), where only four central banks 
receive the highest possible score. And again for policy transparency (prompt 
announcement and comprehensive explanation of policy decisions), where only the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Swedish Riksbank receives the full score and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Among the omissions are Bolivia, Ecuador, Chad, Iran, and Afghanistan   We are aware that this creates 
a form of sampling bias: we tend to oversample more transparent central banks.  There exist econometric 
corrections for this bias (involving strong assumptions), although we have not implemented these yet.  Our 
defense is that the number of consequential omissions is relatively slight. 
18 Up from 47 in 1998.  
20 2006 being the most recent year for which all the ancillary variables are currently available.   9
Fed receive a score of 2.5.  The only central bank receiving a perfect score of 3 for 
operational transparency (release of information about disturbances, control errors, etc.) 
is the Swedish Riksbank. 
Taking unweighted averages of the countries making up a region (as in Table 1), 
we see the highest level of transparency in Australia-New Zealand, followed by Western 
Europe, Northern Europe, South East Asia, Southern Africa, and North America.  That 
South East Asia and Southern Africa are scored as more transparent than North America 
is a figment of the unweighted averages.  When we instead take GDP-weighted averages, 
as in Table 3, the most transparent regions as of 2006, in descending order, are Europe 
(led by Northern Europe), North America, Oceania and Southern Africa (dominated by 
South Africa); lower weights on its relatively transparent small economies causes South 
East Asia to drop down. Either way, the lowest levels of transparency, starting from the 
bottom, are those of Northern Africa, Southern Asia, Eastern Africa and Western Africa ￿ 
no surprises here.  
Turning to trends over time, the average transparency score in our sample rose 
from 3.4 in 1998 and 5.4 in 2006.  Strikingly, none of our 100 countries moved in the 
direction of less transparency.  Figure 1 compares our measure of transparency in 1998 
and 2006 (with 2006 on the vertical axis).  There are only 10 countries on the diagonal, 
indicating no increase in transparency, while the remaining 90 cases are all above and to 
its left. 
Figure 2 shows transparency by level of economic development (again, using 
weighted averages).  Consistent with the preceding discussion, central banks in the 
advanced countries are more transparent than central banks in emerging markets (defined   10
as middle-income countries with significant links to international financial markets), 
which in turn are more transparent than central banks in developing countries.  Consistent 
with the implication of Figure 2 above, there have been increases in central bank 
transparency in all three country groups.  Perhaps most strikingly, the increase among 
emerging markets is, on average, as large in absolute value as the increase among 
advanced countries; the corresponding increase among developing countries is smaller.   
Much of the increase in emerging markets is centered in the period following the Asian 
crisis and again in the early parts of the present decade.    
  
3.  Determinants 
  We now use regression analysis to further characterize differences in central bank 
transparency across countries and over time.  Our goals here are to work toward an 
explanation for these variations and also to identify instruments for our analysis of the 
consequences of transparency.  We proceed in two stages, first updating our previous 
findings and then pursuing a more detailed political-economy analysis. 
We start with the 1998-2006 cross section, with all variables averaged over the 
period.
20  We regress transparency on a vector of economic determinants: per capita 
income, inflation history (defined as the lagged log first difference of the consumer price 
index), the de facto exchange rate regime (the Reinhart-Rogoff 2003 version as updated 
by Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia 2006), and financial depth (defined as the ratio of M2 to 
GDP).  In addition we include a range of potential political determinants: rule of law, 
political stability, voice and accountability, and government efficiency (all taken from 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007), together with a number of measures of   11
democratic orientation (democracy and autocracy dummies and overall polity score) 
taken from the Polity IV data base.
21  Variable definitions and sources are described in 
Appendix A. 
  Since the political variables are strongly correlated with one another, we include 
them one at a time.  (This can be seen from the variance-covariance matrix presented in 
Appendix B.)  The results (Table 4) suggest that per capita GDP is a robust determinant 
of overall transparency.  There is good reason to think that that transparency should rise 
with the general level of economic and institutional development, for which per capita 
income proxies; this is also the measure of Figure 2 above.  In addition, countries with 
more flexible exchange rates (where a larger value of the index denotes greater 
flexibility) tend to be more transparent in the conduct of monetary policy, as anticipated 
by our introduction ￿ the absence of an exchange rate peg eliminating one traditional 
device for monitoring central bank actions.
22   Finally, most of the political variables are 
significant and affect central bank transparency in plausible ways.
23  Greater transparency 
characterizes central bank operations in countries that rank higher in terms of rule of law, 
that have more stable political systems, that have higher ratings in terms of voice and 
accountability, and that are more favorably regarded in terms of government efficiency.
24  
Countries with more open (democratic) political systems are also more likely to have 
                                                 
21 Where we use variables from the Polity data base, we are forced to end the analysis in 2004. 
22 Readers may be concerned that the exchange rate regime is endogenous ￿ that countries with experience 
with monetary policy transparency may be better able to operate regimes of grater flexibility.  In the event,  
dropping the exchange-rate regime leaves the other results unchanged. 
23 The other variables do not approach statistical significance at conventional confidence levels.  For what 
they are worth, the point estimates suggest that central banks of countries with better developed financial 
markets tend to be more transparent.  Similarly, central banks of countries with a history of inflation tend to 
be more transparent, presumably as part of a credibility-building strategy.  This is not something that would 
have been anticipated from the contrast between transparency in advanced and developing countries. 
24 When we include multiple political variables, it is voice and accountability and government efficiency 
that are most often significant at standard confidence levels.   12
transparent central banks; it can be argued that the demand for political accountability is 
strong in such settings and that transparency is an important mechanism for 
accountability.
25  
As a form of sensitivity analysis, we interacted the exchange rate regime with 
openness (exports as a share of GDP) and added openness as an additional regressor.  The 
results (available from the authors on request) suggest that greater openness is associated 
with greater transparency if the country in question has a relatively flexible exchange rate 
but with less transparency if the country has a relatively rigid currency.  This accords 
with intuition and casual observation. 
Next we analyzed the determinants of the individual components of the 
transparency index to gain further insight into exactly how practice responds to these 
same economic and political factors.  In Appendix C we report analogous regressions for 
each component of the transparency index.  As can be seen there, per capita income and 
exchange rate flexibility are positively associated with each of the five components of the 
overall index.  But the different components show different degrees of responsiveness to 
the various political factors.  Political transparency is a positive function of political 
development as measured by voice and accountability.
26  Economic transparency (the 
public disclosure of data, the policy model and forecasts), procedural transparency (the 
release of minutes and votes) and operational transparency (release of information about 
disturbances, control errors, etc.) are, in contrast, positively associated with a range of 
political factors (voice and accountability, government efficiency, democracy versus 
                                                 
25 Note that the ￿polity￿ variable in the final column is the difference between ￿democracy￿ and 
￿autocracy.￿ 
26 Political transparency also appears to decline with financial depth, which is not a pattern for which we 
have an immediate explanation.  Interestingly, other components such as economic and procedural 
transparency are positively associated with financial depth, as can be seen from the corresponding tables.   13
autocracy, and the Polity score).  related to a wide range of political factors.  Policy 
transparency (prompt announcement and comprehensive explanation of policy decisions) 
stands out for being significantly related to each and every one of our measures of 
policies and institutions, not just those that affect economic, procedural and operational 
transparency but also political stability and rule of law.  Thus, there are some subtle 
differences here in terms of which components of the transparency index are driving the 
observed correlation with political and institutional factors ￿ the correlation appears to be 
weakest in the case of political transparency ￿ but the results for the different measures 
are broadly consistent overall.  
  We can also use this specification to consider factors influencing trends in 
transparency.  In Tables 5 and 6 we pool the annual observations and estimate fixed-
effects models (including separate intercepts for each country).
27  The estimates are now 
driven by the time series variation in the data; they thus tell us something about why 
central bank practice is evolving in the direction of greater transparency.  The move to 
more flexible exchange rates (especially in open economies), per capita GDP (as a 
measure of general economic and social capability), rule of law and government 
efficiency appear to be the main variables driving the increase in transparency over time.  
While the democratic/autocratic nature of the political system helped to explain cross 
country patterns above, the spread of democracy does not appear to have much power for 
explaining within-country changes in monetary policy over time. 
                                                 
27 The standard Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests reject random effects and simple pooling in favor of 
fixed effects (the Hausman test statistic is reported at the foot of the tables).  See also the further discussion 
below. 
29 But not between the level of inflation and transparency.   14
The correlation of some of these political variables with central bank 
transparency￿rule of law and government efficiency, in particular￿will be useful when 
we consider the impact of transparency on economic and financial variables below.  That 
is, while it is not hard to come up with an argument for why the transparency of monetary 
policy should affect inflation, financial markets, or the development of trade, it is harder 
to concoct a story for why it should have a first-order effect on, say, rule of law, which 
depends on the larger political and social setting and is the product of a country￿s history.  
It can thus be argued that such political variables satisfy the two criteria for a valid 
instrument: exogeneity and correlation with the explanatory variable of interest.   
The fact that we will be relying on these measures as instruments also makes it 
important that we consider their correlation with the different components of the 
transparency index, as we did with the simple cross section above.  There are some 
suggestive variations here.  (See Appendix D.)  When we focus on trends over time, 
policy transparency displays a correlation only with rule of law.  Economic transparency 
appears to be affected only by political stability and rule of law.  Procedural transparency 
responds only to government efficiency, voice and accountability and rule of law, 
operational transparency to government efficiency, political stability and rule of law.  
Political stability, in contrast, does not display a correlation with either rule of law or 
political stability, but it is moves in the expected manner with most of the other political 
and institutional variables.  15
7.  Effects 
  We now explore the effects of monetary policy transparency.  Some previous 
studies (viz. Mishkin 2004) suggest that greater transparency should be associated with a 
reduction in uncertainty about future policy actions and thus with a reduction in inflation 
volatility.  Consistent with the hypothesis, Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2003), 
employing the Eijffinger-Geraats index for 2001, find a negative relationship between 
inflation variability and central bank transparency.
29  Other studies (viz. Mankiw, Reis 
and Wolfers 2004; Levin, Natalucci and Piger 2004) suggest that there is less variability 
and dispersion in inflation expectations when central banks publish numerical targets for 
inflation.  Still others suggest that greater transparency should be associated with lower 
inflation persistence, insofar as the credibility of monetary policy is enhanced and market 
participants do not extrapolate future inflation from current inflation.  A study of the 
U.S., Sweden and the UK by Gurkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2005) provides indirect 
evidence on this question; it shows that in the U.S., where the authorities do not publish a 
target for inflation, there is a greater tendency for market participants to extrapolate 
inflation expectations from the recent behavior of inflation. 
  These studies are subject to important limitations.  Most compare a relatively 
small set of not-obviously-representative central banks. In other words, central banks that 
are transparent about their policies are not likely to be selected randomly from the larger 
population.  They focus on specific dimensions of transparency (publication of an 
inflation forecast, for example) in lieu of comprehensive measures.  Others utilize 
indicators of transparency that are available only for one year.  Virtually none of them   16
acknowledge that central bank transparency is a choice variable than may itself be 
affected by the economic, financial and political environment.       
  Here we consider the impact on inflation variability and inflation persistence.  In 
contrast to previous studies we acknowledge the endogeneity of monetary policy 
transparency by using the political variables utilized to explain the degree of transparency 
in Section 3 as instruments for transparency in this section￿s (second-stage) regressions.
30  
These second-stage coefficients are estimated using GMM to correct for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in our panel-data set-up. 
  Table 7 reports the estimates for inflation variability.  In each column we report 
the sum of squared residuals comparing the change in the point estimates with the loss of 
efficiency when instrumental variables are used; the change in the point estimates being 
relatively large, this supports our use of instrumental variables.  In addition to the level of 
past inflation, which is positively related to inflation variability, the most important 
determinant is the (fitted value of the) central bank transparency index.  This variable is 
negative and always significant at conventional confidence levels.
31  This is consistent 
with theories suggesting that greater monetary-policy transparency allows the public to 
respond more quickly to policy actions, in turn discouraging the authorities from 
attempting to manipulate inflation in the pursuit of other objectives. 
    Table 8 considers inflation persistence.  Transparency enters negatively and 
significantly when it is interested on its own (column 1), consistent with the notion that 
greater policy transparency allows the public to adjust more quickly, in turn limiting the 
incentive for the central bank to run inflationary policies in the effort to achieve 
                                                 
30 Results using alternative instrument lists are discussed below and are available from the authors on 
request. 
31 Though the confidence level in question depends on which specific controls are included or excluded.   17
objectives other than the maintenance of price stability.  This result is also consistent with 
theories suggesting that greater monetary-policy transparency is a source of policy 
credibility, allowing the authorities to respond to events without exciting expectations of 
chronic inflation.  However, the coefficient in question loses its significance as soon as 
other plausible determinants of inflation persistence are added to the specification.  The 
relationship of transparency to inflation persistence is not as robust, in other words, as its 
relationship to inflation variability.  
  By adding a squared term in transparency we can also ask whether there are 
diminishing returns to central bank transparency (￿whether transparency can go too 
far￿).
33  In the equation for inflation variability, transparency continues to enter with a 
significant negative coefficient as before, but transparency squared enters positively and 
also significantly.  (See Table 9.)  This suggests that increased transparency has the 
strongest effect on inflation variability for the most opaque central banks.
34  The same 
broad pattern is evident in the regressions for inflation persistence, which show 
persistence declining with increased transparency but at a decelerating rate.  In this case, 
however, the coefficients on the squared term designed to capture nonlinearities are not 
significantly different from zero at standard confidence levels.   Again, the relationship 
between transparency and inflation persistence does not appear to be as robust as that 
between transparency and inflation variability. 
                                                 
33 The squared term, like the level, is constructed from the fitted value of transparency derived from the 
first-stage regression. 
34 If the coefficients are taken literally they suggest that the benefits in terms of reducing inflation 
variability dissipate and inflation variability begins to rise with transparency when the index for the latter 
exceeds five, a suspiciously low threshold.  Thus we do not want to push these particular point estimates 
too far.   18
  We explored the sensitivity of these results using alternative instrument lists, for 
example instrumenting transparency with rule of law alone instead of the entire vector of 
political and institutional measures  The results were very similar, with stronger effects of 
transparency on inflation variability than inflation persistence and evidence of 
diminishing returns once transparency reached a certain threshold.  
  Since completing the first draft of this paper, we have seen the analysis of van der 
Cruijsen, Eijffinger and Hoogduin (2008), who similarly ask whether there are nonlinear 
effects of transparency on inflation persistence, with persistence declining initially as 
transparency rises, implying an optimal degree of central bank transparency.  They 
estimate their model using our data and find significant coefficients on both the level and 
squared terms in transparency.  They model persistence differently, using current 
inflation as the dependent variable and including the lagged inflation term interacted with 
transparency (and transparency squared) as an independent variable. They also include a 
different set of controls.   
In fact, the consequential difference between their approach and ours is now how 
persistence is measured or what controls are included but simply whether or not the 
potential endogeneity of transparency (our key point) is taken into account.  In column a 
of Table 11 we show our replication of their result.  But when, as in column b, we use our 
instruments for transparency, the significance of the key coefficients dissolves.
35  In 
columns c and d we substitute our version of the dependent variable, running OLS in 
column c and instrumenting transparency in column d.  In neither case is there evidence 
of a significant impact of transparency on inflation persistence. 
                                                 
35 The versions of the equation run with instruments are again estimated by GMM.  The two-stage least 
squares version simply applying the instruments to transparency yields the same results.   19
  We also explored more closely which component or components of the 
transparency index mainly drive the negative association with inflation variability and 
persistence.  (Results are not reported to avoid a proliferation of tables but are available 
from the authors on request.)  All five components continue to be associated with lower 
inflation variability and (less robustly) with lower inflation persistence when they are 
included one at a time (in each case being instrumented by rule of law). When we include 
all five simultaneously (employing a longer list of political instruments: rule of law, 
political stability, democratic accountability, government efficiency, and regulatory 
quality), there is an obvious multicolinearity problem.  For what it is worth, these results 
suggest that operational transparency (openness about the implementation of those 
decisions), is mainly driving the reduction in inflation variability.  This component enters 
negatively, and its coefficient differs from zero at the 99 percent confidence level.  None 
of the other components have coefficients that differ from zero at standard confidence 
levels. 
36  
  An alternative is to test whether the five dimensions of transparency matter as a 
group.  To this end we constructed the principal components of our measures of the five 
dimensions of transparency.   We entered into the equation the first and second principal 
components (where the first explains 34 per cent of the variation in the group, the second 
12 per cent).  When substituted for the various individual measures of transparency, the 
two principal components enter negatively and significantly in the equation for inflation 
variability (they are significant as a pair and the second principal component is 
                                                 
36 The coefficient on the fifth component enters with a t-statistic of 4.2.  None of the other coefficients have 
t￿s in excess of one.   20
significant individually), but they enter insignificantly in the equation for inflation 
persistence, consistent with the results we report above. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
  Greater transparency of central bank operations is the most dramatic recent 
change in the conduct of monetary policy.  We understand this as a response to changes 
in the monetary policy environment.  It is a way of ensuring the accountability of policy 
makers when the traditional mechanisms for doing so ￿ public monitoring of compliance 
with an exchange rate commitment and direct oversight by a government with formal 
control ￿ are in decline, reflecting the shift to flexible exchange rates and central bank 
independence.   
In this paper we have presented new data on the extent of the trend and its effects.  
The trend is general ￿ a large number of central banks have moved in the direction of 
greater transparency in recent years.  The question is whether it will prove durable or be a 
passing phase.  In part, the answer depends on the consequences.  Our preliminary 
analysis suggests broadly favorable impacts on inflation variability, but less evidence of 
an impact on inflation persistence.  Still, if institutional arrangements that produce 
favorable results retain public support, then this suggests that the trend toward greater 
monetary policy transparency is here to stay. 
The other way of approaching this question is to ask whether the changes in the 
policy environment that precipitated the move toward greater transparency might 
themselves be rolled back. We see the abandonment of pegged exchange rates as a 
response to financial liberalization and greater central bank independence as a way of   21
insulating the conduct of monetary policy from short-term political pressures in 
democracies.  If financial globalization and political democratization are here to stay, as 
we suspect, then so too is greater transparency in the conduct of monetary policy.   22
Data Appendix 
This appendix describes the construction of the transparency index. The index is the sum 
of the scores for answers to the fifteen questions below (min = 0, max = 15). 
1. Political Transparency 
Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives. This comprises a 
formal statement of objectives, including an explicit prioritization in case of multiple 
goals, a quantification of the primary objective(s), and explicit institutional arrangements.  
(a) Is there a formal statement of the objective(s) of monetary policy, with an explicit 
prioritization in case of multiple objectives? 
No formal objective(s) = 0. 
Multiple objectives without prioritization = 1/2. 
One primary objective, or multiple objectives with explicit priority = 1. 
(b) Is there a quantification of the primary objective(s)? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(c) Are there explicit contacts or other similar institutional arrangements between the 
monetary authorities and the government? 
No central bank contracts or other institutional arrangements = 0. 
Central bank without explicit instrument independence or contract = 1/2. 
Central bank with explicit instrument independence or central bank contract 
although possibly subject to an explicit override procedure = 1. 
   23
2. Economic Transparency 
Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for 
monetary policy. This includes economic data, the model of the economy that the central 
bank employs to construct forecasts or evaluate the impact of its decisions, and the 
internal forecasts (model based or judgmental) that the central bank relies on. 
(a) Is the basic economic data relevant for the conduct of monetary policy publicly 
available? (The focus is on the following five variables: money supply, inflation, GDP, 
unemployment rate and capacity utilization.) 
Quarterly time series for at most two out of the five variables = 0. 
Quarterly time series for three or four out of the five variables = 1/2. 
Quarterly time series for all five variables = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank disclose the macroeconomic model(s) it uses for policy 
analysis? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank regularly publish its own macroeconomic forecasts? 
No numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output = 0. 
Numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and/or output published at less than 
quarterly frequency = 1/2. 
Quarterly numerical central bank forecasts for inflation and output for the 
medium term (one to two years ahead), specifying the assumptions about the policy 
instrument (conditional or unconditional forecasts) = 1. 
3. Procedural Transparency   24
Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken. 
(a) Does the central bank provide an explicit policy rule or strategy that describes its 
monetary policy framework? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank give a comprehensive account of policy deliberations (or 
explanations in case of a single central banker) within a reasonable amount of time? 
No or only after a substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Yes, comprehensive minutes (although not necessarily verbatim or attributed) or 
explanations (in case of a single central banker), including a discussion of backward and 
forward-looking arguments = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank disclose how each decision on the level of its main operating 
instrument or target was reached? 
No voting records, or only after substantial lag (more than eight weeks) = 0. 
Non-attributed voting records = 1/2. 
Individual voting records, or decision by single central banker = 1. 
4. Policy Transparency 
Policy transparency means prompt disclosure of policy decisions, together with an 
explanation of the decision, and an explicit policy inclination or indication of likely 
future policy actions. 
(a) Are decisions about adjustments to the main operating instrument or target announced 
promptly?   25
No or only after the day of implementation = 0. 
Yes, on the day of implementation = 1. 
(b) Does the central bank provide an explanation when it announces policy decisions? 
No = 0. 
Yes, when policy decisions change, or only superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, always and including forwarding-looking assessments = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank disclose an explicit policy inclination after every policy 
meeting or an explicit indication of likely future policy actions (at least quarterly)? 
No = 0. 
Yes = 1. 
  
5. Operational Transparency 
Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank￿s 
policy actions. It involves a discussion of control errors in achieving operating targets and 
(unanticipated) macroeconomic disturbances that affect the transmission of monetary 
policy. Furthermore, the evaluation of the macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy 
in light of its objectives is included here as well. 
(a) Does the central bank regularly evaluate to what extent its main policy operating 
targets (if any) have been achieved? 
No or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes but without providing explanations for significant deviations = 1/2. 
Yes, accounting for significant deviations from target (if any); or, (nearly) perfect 
control over main operating instrument/target = 1.   26
(b) Does the central bank regularly provide information on (unanticipated) 
macroeconomic disturbances that affect the policy transmission process? 
No or not very often = 0. 
Yes but only through short-term forecasts or analysis of current macroeconomic 
developments (at least quarterly) = 1/2. 
Yes including a discussion of past forecast errors (at least annually) = 1. 
(c) Does the central bank regularly provide an evaluation of the policy outcome in light 
of its macroeconomic objectives? 
No or not very often (at less than annual frequency) = 0. 
Yes but superficially = 1/2. 
Yes, with an explicit account of the contribution of monetary policy in meeting 
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Definition of Inflation persistence:  We take the 12 months of inflation data for the current year 
and regress inflation on inflation in the previous month.  The estimated coefficient is the measure 
of inflation persistence in the regression equation. 
Source for Political Indicators data and detailed country ratings: 
’Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-2007￿, by D. 
Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance 
1. Voice and Accountability (VA) ￿ measuring perceptions of the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV) ￿ measuring perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
3. Government Effectiveness (GE) ￿ measuring perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
such policies. 
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) ￿ measuring perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
5. Rule of Law (RL) ￿ measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
4
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